(January 31) Walid Mualem, Syria's ambassador to Washington and leader of its negotiating team with Israel, offers little hope that Syria will soften its position to facilitate a resumption of peace talks and warns of unstated "options" if the talks fail.

He also delicately lifts the veil which shrouds perceptions in that most tightly controlled and opaque state in the region.

Mualem's reflections are the result of a series of three interviews conducted over a period of time ending in late November with Linda Butler, managing editor of the Journal of Palestine Studies, a quarterly published in Washington by the Beirut-based Institute for Palestine Studies. The interview will appear in the journal's winter edition.

Those who have access to advance copies regard it with alarm because of its distortion, intransigence, inflexibility and, not least, its implied threat.

Nor, say veteran observers of the Damascus regime, is Mualem speaking for himself; rather, he is faithfully executing the wishes and expressing the disingenuous, but carefully calculated sentiments of Syrian President Hafez Assad.

The interview, they say, strengthens the view of those who argue that Syria is not serious about making peace with Israel. In the absence of its former Soviet ally, its participation in the peace process has been designed principally to placate Washington and to establish its place in a new, unipolar world.

They also fear that the interview, exceptional in its depth, scope and candor for a senior Syrian official, could be the opening diplomatic salvo from Damascus in an offensive that is intended to lead to military conflict.

In the interview, Mualem maintained:

€ The late prime minister Yitzhak Rabin had undertaken to withdraw from the Golan to the June 4, 1967, lines and that this had been reaffirmed by his successor, Shimon Peres.

€ Rabin and Peres had agreed to a formula that offered equal and mutual security arrangements.

€ Syria had rejected Israel's "exaggerated" proposals for normalization and for security arrangements (which, he admitted, had included the offer to Syria of an early-warning ground station in Safed).

€ Unless Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu accepts the Rabin/Peres commitment to withdraw to the June 4, 1967, lines and their commitment to equal, mutual security arrangements, "all options are open."

He also said Damascus had refrained from assisting Peres's election campaign because Syria did not wish to interfere in Israel's domestic affairs.

And he said Syria had refused to "do their work for them" by helping the Israeli government prepare the Israeli public opinion for peace.

He described Rabin as "reluctant, suspicious, very cautious" but noted that Peres had sent a message to the negotiators saying he wanted to "fly high and fast."

Mualem blamed the current impasse on Peres, first for calling early elections and then for suspending negotiations over what the Syrian envoy described as "so-called terrorism" following the February/March suicide bombings.

He insisted that Syria regarded Rabin's commitment to a total withdrawal from the Golan as binding on the current government and as the non-negotiable starting point for future talks between Israel and Syria.

"When you are in official talks, commitments are formal," he said. "When prime minister Rabin committed himself to withdrawal, he was representing Israel, not himself personally. After Rabin was assassinated, Peres informed us in November through the Americans that he wanted to continue the talks, and he repeated the commitment."

Mualem brushed aside the position of Netanyahu that unwritten, unsigned proposals did not commit his government: "This is a new interpretation of international law."

The Syrian envoy said Israel's commitment to full withdrawal came only after "enormous effort," noting that since the October 1991 Madrid peace conference, "the only issue we would even consent to discuss was full withdrawal."

Under the Likud government of former prime minister Yitzhak Shamir, he said "it was a dialogue of the deaf... After Rabin became prime minister in June 1992, we still insisted on discussing withdrawal only.

"When Rabin finally realized that the Syrians would not move a step ahead in discussing any of the other elements of a peace settlement before being convinced of Israel's intention of full withdrawal, he made the opening.

"That was in August 1993, and we negotiated the details of the withdrawal element for almost a year, until July 1994, when we finalized the agreement on full withdrawal to the June 4, 1967, lines."

Asked why Syria insisted on the June 4, 1967, lines rather than the international boundaries, Mualem said: "The difference between the international border and the June 4 border is very slight on the ground, actually. This land has no strategic importance, but the issue is sovereignty. Every inch of our land is sacred to our people."

Rabin's acquiescence in Syria's demand for a total withdrawal "opened the way for negotiations on the other elements of a peace agreement ­ what prime minister Rabin used to call the 'four legs of the table.'"

With the agreement on withdrawal, Mualem said he and then-Israeli ambassador to Washington Itamar Rabinovich started talks on normalization, security arrangements and a timetable for the implementation of the agreements.

But despite Rabin's agreement to Syria's demand for a withdrawal to the June 4, 1967, lines, Syria, he said, opposed Israel's "exaggerated" proposals for security arrangements and normalization.

The major point of contention on security issues was Israel's request for an early-warning station on the Golan following withdrawal.

Syria, he said, considered this "an infringement of our sovereignty, as if they wanted to spy on us from our own territory ­ and this in a situation of peace, not a situation of war.

"They already have the technology, including satellites ­ their own and American ­ that can do the job far more effectively on the ground than early-warning stations. Their insistence on ground stations put a question mark in our minds.

"They also spoke of the size of the Syrian army, as if what was important was numbers rather than the quality and type of equipment and armaments and such things as the possession of a nuclear arsenal.

"Finally, they insisted that the demilitarized zones reach just south of Damascus. This means you open the capital to them. We refused all these demands."

Syria also opposed Israel's proposals for normalization: "Israel believed that you can push a button to make peace warm, to direct Syrian popular attitudes from a state of war to a state of peace....

"It is always necessary to educate and inform the people. They need to read the agreement to see whether it conforms to their interests, they need to believe in it. You can't oblige them to buy Israeli goods or visit Israel if they are not convinced that Israel has changed from being an enemy to a neighbor.

"An agreement which is signed by the leadership tells what is required from our side, but we cannot be obliged to make the peace warm." He said Israel "wanted open borders, open markets for their goods, and so on.

"This would have an obvious effect on our own economy. Our economic regulations are not against them; we do not open our markets to any country. And how can you integrate two economies when one has a per-capita income of $900 per year and the other has a per-capita income of $15,000 per year?

"Such integration is not possible, so we discussed a transitional period during which we could raise our economy to the level where there can be competition without undue hardship on our society."

He denied that Syria was responsible for the slow pace of progress in the talks, even after Rabin's offer of a full withdrawal to the June 4, 1967, lines.

"First of all, people seem to believe that it is the Syrians that are not moving. This is not the case. Israel moved very slowly, very cautiously, until after Oslo II had been concluded, and especially until Peres became prime minister.

"Rabin's strategy was to decouple the Palestinian, Syrian, Jordanian, and Lebanese tracks ­ he controlled the pace of our negotiations according to what was happening on the other tracks.

"When he moved on the Palestinian track in September 1993, for example, he informed us through the Americans that he could not proceed on the Syrian track because the Israeli public needed time to digest the Oslo accord. So he suspended our talks.

"Then he moved on the Jordanian track in 1994 and informed us that the Israeli public needed time to digest the Jordanian-Israeli agreement. Again, our talks were suspended.

"It was only after the Israelis finalized Oslo II with the Palestinians in September 1995 that they turned to us and wanted to move very quickly."

Another reason cited by Mualem for the slow pace was the "personal difference between Rabin and Peres. Both men wanted to achieve a settlement with Syria, but each had his own speed and conditions. Rabin was reluctant, suspicious, very cautious. He moved very slowly, inch by inch.

"When Peres became prime minister, he was in a hurry ­ he wanted to enter the elections with the Syrian-Israeli agreement in his hand. He wanted to 'fly high and fast,' as he used to say.

"I used to tell the Israeli counterpart that it is important to fly, but it is also very important to know when and where to land ­ you can't continue to fly high and fast.

"We have our public opinion and need to sell the agreement to them, to get them to accept it. But he couldn't wait. He [Peres] was in office less than three months when he called elections."

Mualem said that earlier, he, Peres's new negotiating head Uri Savir, and US peace coordinator Dennis Ross "set a deadline for ourselves, agreeing to close the remaining gaps and finalize all the elements of an agreement by June 1996."

With the Peres negotiator ensconced at the Wye Plantation in Maryland, "there was a new Israeli team and we had started to find solutions. On certain items we found bridges....

"The expectation was that by September 1996 the final document would be ready," he said. "So we were very surprised when, soon afterward, Mr. Peres called early elections.

"The talks were still going on when secretary [of state Warren] Christopher came to Wye Plantation on January 25 and informed me of prime minister Peres's decision. This was not pleasant news for us and the Americans."

After the suicide bombings in February and March, Israel suspended the talks: "From that time, of course, everything began to collapse," said Mualem, as attention switched from negotiations to combating what he described as "so-called terrorism."

Asked whether, with hindsight, Syria should have accepted the terms offered by the former Labor government, even if this entailed the "heavy price" of an early-warning ground station in the Golan, Mualem replied: "We are the only party who can decide whether the price is heavy or not heavy.

"These things matter to us because it is a question of our sovereignty. We will not permit under any circumstances a ground station in our territory manned by the Israelis ­ we would refuse even if it would be manned by the Americans. They offered us a ground station in Safed, and we said no because we will not allow one on our soil.

"Given advanced technological means, the only reason for the Israelis to insist on having a ground station is to show that they are in the Golan against our sovereignty."

He also rejected suggestions that Syria might have made "a small gesture" to help Peres win the election: "After he began bombing Lebanon in Grapes of Wrath, after the Kana massacre, how could Syria make a gesture for him?" asked Mualem.

"But more important, Syria does not interfere in Israel's affairs. The Israelis have to vote according to their will. Nobody can impose peace on the other ­ peace must represent the interests of both sides. If the Israelis do not see peace in their interests, this is for them to decide.

"This, actually, was a problem with the negotiations all along. We always felt that the Israelis wanted Syria to do their work for them. They wanted us to convince their public that peace was in their interests. We prepared our public for peace with Israel.

"Many things changed in our media, but they wanted us to speak in the Israeli media to prepare Israeli public opinion. They wanted us to allow Israelis to visit Syria.

"We considered such insistence a negative sign: When you do not prepare your own public for peace with your neighbor, this means you do not really have the intention to make peace."

He said there was "no reason" for Syria to embark on talks with the Netanyahu government "if we are not certain that the end result of the negotiations will be a return of the Golan to the lines of June 4, 1967. "As long as he [Netanyahu] wants to negotiate on the basis of 'peace-for-peace,' he will find no Syrian willing to talk to him."

Mualem stressed that "nothing can compensate the Syrian people for losing one inch in the Golan. Not even the moon. The Golan is our territory. It is a sacred cause for the Syrian people, and we will continue to struggle until we recover this territory to the lines of June 4, 1967."

He denied an Israel Television report that he had informed a senior US official that negotiations could resume on the basis of an Israel declaration of principle recognizing the land-for-peace formula.

"This is not accurate. We have a single position, and it has never changed. The principle of land-for-peace alone is not sufficient.... We need Israeli acceptance of what Rabin committed Israel to ­ full withdrawal to the line of June 4, 1967 ­ and an Israeli commitment to the Aims and Principles of Security Arrangements paper reached in May 1995 after Rabin's visit to Washington.

"They also have to agree to resume talks from the point where they left off in February 1996. All these issues were approved in the presence of the American co-sponsor. These points are crucial for Syria.

"If ever we were to agree to return to the table without Netanyahu's commitment both to full withdrawal and to honor the American-drafted paper on security arrangements [which establishes the principle of equality and mutuality on security issues], we would lose all we achieved in the negotiations.

"It would be like throwing away Israel's earlier commitments and going back to square one."

And if the peace process fails, he warned, "all options are open. In Syria, peace is still our strategic option... But you cannot achieve peace by yourself, you need a partner for peace.

"We do not yet see signs that the Netanyahu government is such a partner or that Netanyahu has a strategy for peace.

"He has a strategy for expanding the settlements, which are bullets in the heart of the peace process. For that reason, all options are open."

The envoy declined to elaborate: "All options are open. Let's leave it at that."
 

Foreign Minister David Levy said Israel and Syria must try and bridge the gap and find an acceptable formula that will enable resumption of peace talks. Levy was speaking after a meeting with the European Union's special Middle East envoy in Jerusalem who said he believed President Assad would return to the peace talks after Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu declares that resolution 242 means land for peace.

At the same time, Levy accused Syria of conducting a dual policy; talking peace but arming Hizbullah and encouraging their attacks on Israel. (KOL ISRAEL 2/4) 

Over the weekend, the US warned Syria to put a halt to Hizbullah attacks on the IDF in southern Lebanon. In Washington, a senior administration official would not confirm whether Secretary of State Madeleine Albright spoke with Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk Shara on the matter, but said, "We have communicated these views to the Syrians."

Washington is aware that the attack could be linked to recent efforts to bring about a resumption of Israeli-Syrian peace talks, and the US is once again telling Damascus that the link must be cut, he said.

The official added that with Netanyahu coming to the US next week to discuss with President Bill Clinton how to resume the talks, Syria ought to create a better climate by clamping down on Hizbullah. (JP 2/2)

Foreign Minister David Levy said after meeting French President Jacques Chirac on Friday that peace talks with Syria are not frozen and that France wants to help narrow Israeli-Syrian differences.

Levy accused Syria of direct responsibility for last week's attack in which three IDF soldiers were killed by Hizbullah. "Syria is more than directly responsible [for events in south Lebanon]. It transfers weapons that arrive from Iran. Such behavior is not compatible with Syria's declarations about its desire to achieve peace.

"If peace serves the interests of both sides, Syria has an opportunity to prove the sincerity of its declarations. It must contribute to creating the conditions which will bring us to resume the peace talks," Levy said.

The future of Israeli-Syrian peace talks and the situation in Lebanon were the two major topics Levy discussed with Chirac and with his French counterpart, Herve de-Charette, later on Friday. 

Levy told the two that, since Operation Grapes of Wrath, Syria has allowed increased supplies of weapons to Hizbullah in south Lebanon. Planes full of military equipment from Iran arrive in Lebanon under Syrian supervision, he said. "This situation cannot go on. Syria has to choose its way," he told Chirac. Levy tried to tone down tensions with Syria, speaking about the need to avoid a verbal war and to resume negotiations as quickly as possible.

Chirac told Levy that the Syrians are willing to examine every proposal that would help bridge the gap between the two countries' positions. Levy said he did not ask Chirac to transmit any message to Damascus, saying he is waiting to hear from the EU special envoy to the Middle East, who visited the Syrian capital last week. (JP 2/2)

Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu is to meet Pope Paul II in the Vatican tomorrow. He will request the Pope to visit Israel as soon as possible.

It is expected that the status of Jerusalem will be a central theme in their discussions. The Vatican and Israeli government agree that political and religious aspects of Jerusalem should be separate. Netanyahu said he is willing to give the Pope guarantees about freedom of religion in Jerusalem, but sovereignty is not a topic for discussion.

The Pope has stated on many occasions his desire to visit Jerusalem and promises to do so before the year 2000. (YEDIOT AHARONOT 2/2)